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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2009, the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.1 The case presented an important 
Confrontation Clause question: are laboratory certificates of analysis, 
such as those used by prosecutors in drug cases to prove the identity 
of a seized substance, testimonial evidence that must be subjected to 
cross-examination?2 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that 
these laboratory certificates were indeed testimonial evidence.3 The 
ruling’s impact was substantial; for the first time, states would be 
required to provide criminal defendants with the opportunity to 
cross-examine the laboratory analysts responsible for the certificates.4 
Confrontation Clause scholar and University of Michigan law 
professor Richard D. Friedman had conflicting thoughts as he reacted 
to the decision.5 On the one hand, the University of Michigan law 
professor thought the Court’s ruling was “the right result, for the right 
reasons.”6 On the other hand, Friedman had recently filed his own 
petition for certiorari in the case of Briscoe v. Virginia, asking the 
Supreme Court to decide whether a Virginia statute violated the 
Confrontation Clause by not requiring the prosecution to subpoena 
*2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. See id. The majority acknowledged that precedent grants an exception to this 
requirement, but only when (1) there has been a showing that the analyst(s) will not be 
available at trial, and (2) the criminal defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination of the analyst(s). Id. 
 5. See The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (June 25, 2009, 
20:05 EST). 
 6. Id. 
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laboratory analysts in cases where it wishes to introduce certificates of 
analysis into evidence.7 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Melendez-
Diaz seemed to directly address this question, explicitly denouncing 
so-called “burden-shifting” statutes that pass the responsibility of 
calling an analyst to testify from the prosecution to the defense.8 “I 
confess I was a little sorry to see this part of the opinion . . . ,” 
Friedman wrote on his blog that evening. “I would have loved to 
argue it. Instead, we get handed a victory without argument. Darn.”9 
Four days later, in a move that even petitioners’ attorney 
Friedman did not anticipate, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Briscoe.10 This unexpected announcement generated speculation 
about the Court’s next step with regard to Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.11 Some commentators believe that the grant of 
certiorari is an indication that the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz 
is in danger of being substantially limited or even overturned.12 The 
arguments in Briscoe will set the stage for an important ruling on the 
limits of the Confrontation Clause in criminal cases involving the 
testimony of laboratory analysts. 
II.  FACTS 
Briscoe is a consolidation of two cases which arose in different 
Virginia circuit courts.13 The petitioners, criminal defendants Mark 
Briscoe and Sheldon Cypress, were both charged with crimes relating 
to the possession of cocaine.14 In February 2005, police officers 
executed a search warrant at Mark Briscoe’s apartment in Alexandria, 
Virginia.15 Upon entering the kitchen, officers found a wide variety of 
drug paraphernalia, including scales, a weight, plastic sandwich bags, a 
 7. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Briscoe v. Virginia, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Mar. 29, 
2008). 
 8. See Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-591 at 19 (saying that a Massachusetts law granting criminal 
defendants the right to subpoena the analyst was “no substitute for the right of confrontation”). 
 9. The Confrontation Blog, supra note 5. 
 10. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (granting petition for 
certiorari). 
 11. See, e.g., Steven N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the 
Lab, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 2009, at 28 (noting that legal commentators have suggested various 
reasons for the grant of certiorari in Briscoe). 
 12. See, e.g., Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/new-lab-report-case-granted (June 29, 2009, 13:51EST) 
(suggesting that the dissenting justices in Melendez-Diaz are looking to use Briscoe to make 
Melendez-Diaz easier to subvert, and possibly obsolete). 
 13. Brief of Petitioners at 5, Briscoe v. Virginia, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2009). 
 14. Id. at 4. 
 15. Joint Appendix at 21, Briscoe, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2009). 
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razor blade, and what appeared to be cocaine residue.16 A search of 
Briscoe’s person also yielded a “white rocklike substance” that police 
officers believed was crack cocaine.17 
Sheldon Cypress was arrested in June of 2005 when police pulled 
over a car in which he was a passenger.18 The officer saw a marijuana 
cigarette in plain view and subsequently searched the vehicle.19 He 
found white chunks that appeared to be crack cocaine, as well as 
scales, plastic baggies, and what appeared to be marijuana.20 The 
officer seized the evidence and arrested Cypress.21 
Following their arrests, the petitioners’ cases followed 
substantially similar paths.22 In each case the police submitted the 
confiscated substances for forensic analysis.23 In Briscoe’s case, the 
laboratory analyst concluded that the confiscated substances 
amounted to 36.578 grams of “solid material cocaine.”24 In Cypress’s 
case, tests revealed that the police had seized 60.5 grams of cocaine.25 
In both cases the analysts reported their findings in signed certificates 
of analysis.26 Each certificate contained an attestation that the 
information printed therein was accurate.27 
Briscoe and Cypress were charged with multiple drug-related 
crimes, including possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.28 At 
both trials, the prosecution sought to introduce the certificates of 
analysis into evidence, despite petitioners’ objections on Sixth 
Amendment grounds.29 Petitioners argued that because the 
certificates were testimonial evidence, the prosecution could not 
present them without also calling the analyst responsible for the 
certificates to be present for cross-examination.30 Both defendants’ 
objections were overruled.31 In each case, the circuit court judge held 
that the petitioner had the right under Virginia Code § 19.2197.1 to 
 16. Id. at 24. 
 17. Id. at 18. 
 18. Id. at 94–95. 
 19. Id. at 96. 
 20. Id. at 97. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4. 
 23. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 116–17 (Va. 2008). 
 24. Id. at 117. 
 25. Id. at 116. 
 26. Id. at 116–17. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4. 
108 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:104 
 
call the analyst to appear at trial as a hostile witness, and that this was 
sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause.32 
Neither defendant elected to subpoena the analyst.33 
Petitioners were found guilty of possession-related crimes and 
were sentenced to terms in prison.34 The Court of Appeals denied 
their separate appeals, holding that a criminal defendant waives his 
right to confront a laboratory analyst in court if he refuses to call the 
analyst as a defense witness under the procedure mandated by Code § 
19.2187.1.35 The two cases were consolidated on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia.36 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Confrontation Clause is found in the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.37 The Amendment provides, in part, that 
in criminal cases, “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”38 This Clause 
traditionally has been viewed as a protection of the criminal 
defendant’s right to an in-person cross-examination of the witnesses 
testifying against him.39 Though the Clause’s language itself does not 
contain any qualifications, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that a defendant’s right to confrontation is not without limits.40 
The Court attempted to clarify one such limit in the 1980 case 
Ohio v. Roberts.41 In Roberts, the Court held that testimony could be 
admitted without an accompanying opportunity for live cross-
examination by the defense if it contained certain “indicia of 
reliability.”42 The Court said that the general purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause was to ensure the opportunity for cross-
examination, which was necessary to provide the trier-of-fact with a 
reliable method of determining the truth of an accusing witness’s 
 32. Joint Appendix, supra note 15, at 49. 
 33. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Magruder, 657 S.E.2d at 116–17. 
 36. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13, at 5. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). 
 40. See e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1980) (remarking that the Confrontation 
Clause’s rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence is not absolute because such an 
interpretation would be “too extreme”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 66. 
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statement.43 If, however, a witness’s testimony met a high threshold of 
reliability, the Court reasoned that there would be no need for face-
to-face confrontation.44 Testimony met this threshold if it either (1) 
fell under traditional evidentiary hearsay exceptions, or (2) bore 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”45 
The “indicia of reliability” test caused significant confusion in 
lower courts during the decade that followed the Roberts decision.46 
In response, the Supreme Court in 2004 overruled the Roberts 
decision in Washington v. Crawford.47 In that case, Defendant 
Crawford was charged with stabbing a man who was allegedly 
attempting to rape Crawford’s wife, Sylvia.48 The prosecution sought 
to admit into evidence Sylvia’s tape-recorded description of the 
stabbing, as Sylvia herself was unable to be present at trial due to 
spousal privilege.49 Although the recording did not fall under a 
traditional hearsay exception, the lower court held that it was 
admissible because Sylvia’s statement was almost identical to 
Crawford’s own testimony, and therefore had “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” that assured its reliability under the 
Roberts standard.50 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision on the same grounds.51 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court. The Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment granted criminal defendants the right to be 
confronted with the evidence proffered by the witnesses against them, 
including their “testimony.”52 The Court concluded that the framers of 
the Sixth Amendment intended the reliability of this “testimonial” 
evidence to be tested not by judges, but rather by the criminal 
defendant using the tool of cross-examination.53 In order to satisfy the 
demands of the Confrontation Clause, then, the Court held that 
testimonial evidence created out-of-court, such as tape recordings or 
affidavits, may not be admitted unless the witness is unavailable and 
 43. Id. at 65–66. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 66. 
 46. Washington v. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 62–63 (2004) (calling the Roberts test “so 
unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations”). 
 47. See id. at 67. 
 48. Id. at 40. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 41. 
 52. Id. at 51. 
 53. Id. at 61. 
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there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.54 
During its 2008 term, the Court attempted to define this standard 
of “testimonial” evidence.55 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the 
State sought to introduce into evidence a laboratory analysis 
certificate containing the results of tests run on substances found on 
the defendant during a search.56 The defendant argued that the 
certificates should be barred from evidence because the analyst 
responsible for preparing the certificate was not present at trial for 
cross-examination.57 The central question in Melendez-Diaz was 
whether such a certificate constituted “testimonial” evidence and, 
therefore, could not be admitted without the live, in-court testimony 
of an analyst.58 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that laboratory analysis 
certificates are essentially affidavits, and that they therefore fall into 
the “core class of testimonial statements” established by the Crawford 
decision.59 Melendez-Diaz held that in cases where the prosecution 
seeks to admit a laboratory analysis certificate into evidence, the 
prosecution must produce the analyst responsible for the certificate at 
trial.60 Responding to the State’s argument that the defendant had 
refused to exercise the right granted to him by Massachusetts statute 
to subpoena the witness himself, the Court explained that “the 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present 
its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses 
into court.”61 The value of the Sixth Amendment to criminal 
defendants, according to Melendez-Diaz, is that it forces the 
prosecution to bring forth adverse witnesses at trial.62 To this end, the 
Court held that provisions requiring the defense to produce a 
laboratory analyst were ineffective guarantees of confrontation in 
situations where the witness failed to appear.63 
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the confrontation 
 54. Id. at 68. 
 55. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2009) 
(presenting the issue of whether a laboratory analyst’s testimony in a certificate of analysis is 
“testimonial” evidence under the standard set forth in Crawford). 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1 (unless there is an exception under rules set forth in Crawford). 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
 61. Id. at 19. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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requirement established in Crawford did not apply to all testimonial 
witnesses.64 Rather, the only testimonial statements encompassed by 
the Confrontation Clause were those made by “conventional 
witnesses” with some personal knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.65 
The dissent argued that a laboratory analyst is not the kind of 
ordinary witness that the Framers of the Sixth Amendment had in 
mind when they thought of cross-examination.66 Furthermore, the 
dissent predicted that the Court’s decision would have a substantial 
negative impact on the current operation of the criminal justice 
system.67 The dissent expressed concern about the increased cost to 
the state that the Court’s “new rule” would cause, as more analysts 
would need to be hired and more effort would be required on the part 
of the prosecution to ensure these analysts’ presence in court.68 The 
dissent also foresaw a situation in which defendants would escape 
judgment because analysts would inevitably be unable to appear in 
person at every single trial involving a laboratory certificate.69 
The Melendez-Diaz decision informed states that in order for the 
prosecution to introduce into evidence laboratory certificates of 
analysis, the defendant must have the opportunity to confront the 
analyst who prepared the certificate at trial.70 However, the question 
of what constitutes an acceptable procedure for guaranteeing this 
right to cross-examination remains unanswered.71 Virginia’s 
procedure is found in Virginia Code § 19.2–187.1, which guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to call a laboratory analyst for cross-
examination as a hostile witness.72 The statute re
The accused in any hearing or trial in which a certificate of analysis 
is offered into evidence shall have the right to call the person 
performing such analysis or examination or involved in the chain 
of custody as a witness therein, and examine him in the same 
manner as if he had been called as an adverse witness. Such 
 64. Id. at 2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 14–15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 71. Melendez-Diaz indicates that a state law requiring a defendant to subpoena a 
laboratory analyst for cross-examination would not pass constitutional muster, see Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 25, 2009); however, the fact that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Briscoe suggests that this portion of Melendez-Diaz is the 
subject of some dispute. 
 72. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2009) 
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witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the 
Commonwealth.73 
Virginia is not the only state that requires the defendant, rather 
than the prosecution, to call a laboratory analyst as a hostile witness.74 
Similar statutes have been held constitutional by the highest state 
courts in North Dakota, Tennessee, and North Carolina.75 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court, for instance, held that a state law requiring a 
criminal defendant to subpoena a laboratory analyst was valid and 
that “[f]ailure to summon the analyst results in a waiver of any right 
to examine the analyst and contest the findings.”76 However, high 
courts in Florida, the District of Columbia, and Oregon have 
expressly rejected analogous statutes in their own states, deeming 
them to be unconstitutional.77 According to the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, a law requiring a defendant to call an analyst to 
testify violated the Sixth Amendment because the Confrontation 
Clause imposes a “burden of production on the prosecution, not on 
the defense.”78 
IV.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that § 19.2–187.1 was 
constitutional because it sufficiently protected the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights.79 The court analyzed the statute 
under the assumption that certificates of analysis were “testimonial” 
evidence, although because the case was being analyzed pre-
Melendez-Diaz, the court questioned the validity of this argument.80 
The court first found that the statute satisfied the essential facets 
of confrontation: “physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and 
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.”81 That confrontation 
would not occur until after the prosecution introduced the certificates 
into evidence was irrelevant, according to the court, because the Sixth 
Amendment required only that criminal defendants be afforded the 
 73. Id. 
 74. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 5–10. 
 75. Id. at 5–6. 
 76. State v. Smith, 323 S.E.2d 316, 328 (N.C. 1984). 
 77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6–8. 
 78. Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 2006). 
 79. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Va. 2008). 
 80. Id. at 118 (deciding that it would be unnecessary to decide if a certificate of analysis is 
“testimonial” evidence). 
 81. Id. at 120–21. 
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opportunity for cross-examination at some point during the trial.82 
Second, the court held, contrary to the defendants’ arguments, that § 
19.2–187.1 did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of production 
from the prosecution to the defense.83 The court relied on precedent 
granting state legislatures latitude to reasonably regulate procedures 
by which criminal defendants exercise their constitutional 
guarantees.84 
Finally, the court concluded that Briscoe’s and Cypress’s failure to 
call the laboratory analysts as witnesses pursuant to § 19.2–187.1 
equated a waiver of their confrontation rights.85 The court said that 
the defendants should have exercised their right to cross-examine the 
analysts by either: 
issuing summons for their appearance at the Commonwealth’s 
cost, or asking the trial court or Commonwealth to do so. At trial, 
the defendants could have called the forensic analysts as witnesses, 
placed them under oath, and questioned them as adverse 
witnesses, meaning the defendants could have cross-examined 
them.86 
The court said that it was not necessary for defendants to make an 
affirmative showing of their “knowing, voluntary, and affirmative 
agreement” to this waiver.87 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court of Virginia anticipated the trajectory of Sixth 
Amendment case law by basing its decision on the assumption that 
certificates of analysis were testimonial evidence.88 As the Supreme 
Court had not yet decided Melendez-Diaz, it was not yet settled that 
the certificates were indeed testimonial evidence as described in 
Crawford.89 By assuming this evidentiary status, the court made 
Briscoe the perfect vehicle for further exploration of the limits of 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 122. 
 85. Id. at 124. 
 86. Id. at 121. 
 87. Id. at 124. 
 88. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 4 (saying that state court decisions, 
like that of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Magruder, “operate on the assumption that the 
reports are testimonial”). 
 89. See Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 118 (Va. 2008) (refusing to consider 
the unanswered question of the testimonial nature of laboratory certificates of analysis). 
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Melendez-Diaz.90 As several states currently have laws requiring the 
defendant to call a lab analyst as a hostile witness, it is important for 
the Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of this procedure in 
light of the Melendez-Diaz ruling.91 
At least one aspect of the lower court’s decision, however, could 
cause some difficulty on appeal. The respondents argue that the 
Virginia court did not interpret § 19.2–187.1 as requiring a defendant 
to call the laboratory analyst.92 The plain language of the statute lends 
itself to such an interpretation, and although the court concluded that 
the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to call the 
analyst,93 there is an ambiguous phrase in the opinion that may 
support the respondents’ argument. The problematic language lies in 
the state court’s assertion that Briscoe and Cypress waived their 
rights to confrontation by not “issuing summons for [the analysts’] 
appearance at the Commonwealth’s cost, or asking the trial courts or 
Commonwealth to do so.”94 If this sentence is a valid interpretation of 
§ 19.2–187.1, the Supreme Court might determine that the Virginia 
statute does not require a burden-shift because this sentence appears 
to say that the defendant could ask the prosecution to subpoena the 
analyst.95 Regardless of whether this ambiguity proves to be 
important, it is nonetheless troubling that one poorly-worded phrase 
can be used as fodder to support arguments seeking to prevent the 
Supreme Court from using Briscoe to provide necessary answers 
about the limits of Melendez-Diaz. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS 
A. Briscoe and Cypress’s Arguments 
Briscoe and Cypress’s primary argument against the 
constitutionality of § 19.2–187.1 is rooted in explicit language from 
 90. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
 91. See Brief of the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–
17, Briscoe v. Virginia, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (describing the laws of several states 
that do not automatically require the prosecution to produce a laboratory analyst for live 
testimony, but provide either for the defendant to demand the laboratory analyst’s presence or 
for the laboratory analyst to testify via telecommunication equipment). 
 92. Brief of Respondents at 15–16, Briscoe, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 93. See Magruder, 657 S.E.2d at 122 (holding that only the opportunity for cross-
examination is protected by the Confrontation Clause (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 
554, 559 (1988))). 
 94. Id. at 120–21. 
 95. Brief of Respondents, supra note 92, at 16. 
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the Melendez-Diaz majority opinion.96 In Melendez-Diaz, Justice 
Scalia clearly stated that statutes requiring a defendant to call a 
laboratory analyst did not meet the confrontation demands of the 
Sixth Amendment.97 Briscoe and Cypress argue that § 19.2–187.1, 
which they characterize as imposing a subpoena requirement on 
criminal defendants who wish to cross-examine laboratory analysts,98 
clearly falls into this category of proscribed statutes.99 
Briscoe and Cypress further contend that the syntax of the 
Confrontation Clause was structured specifically to prevent laws like 
§ 19.2-187.1.100 They point to the fact that the passive voice is used 
when granting criminal defendants the right “to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.”101 According to Briscoe and Cypress, this 
wording was intentionally chosen to ensure that the state would bear 
the burden of producing witnesses against criminal defendants so that 
they might be subjected to cross-examination.102 To bolster this textual 
argument, they contrast the passive voice of the Confrontation Clause 
with the active voice of the Compulsory Process Clause which grants 
defendants the right to call witnesses in their own favor.103 If the 
Amendment’s authors had intended criminal defendants to take 
affirmative action to ensure the availability of adverse witnesses for 
confrontation, petitioners reason, the verb tense in the two clauses 
would be similar.104 
Briscoe and Cypress also argue that upholding § 19.2–187.1 as a 
subpoena statute would cause negative effects incompatible with the 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause.105 For example, they claim that 
requiring the defendant to call an analyst to testify during the defense 
portion of the trial would create a substantial time gap between the 
introduction of the certificate of analysis and the actual cross-
examination.106 Briscoe and Cypress claim this gap would deprive the 
 96. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13 at 5. 
 97. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 25, 2009) (saying 
that “state law” granting a defendant the power to call a prosecution witness to testify is “no 
substitute for confrontation”). 
 98. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 13, at 16 (characterizing the Virginia statute as allowing 
defendants to subpoena laboratory analysts if they wish to conduct a cross-examination). 
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. Id. at 14. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 14–15. 
 105. Id. at 18. 
 106. Id. 
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defendant of an essential element of cross-examination: the 
immediate dissection of adverse testimony.107 Calling the analyst long 
after the prosecution introduces the certificate of analysis could 
annoy the jury, they argue, and might even cause jury members to see 
the defense as harassing the witness.108 It might also interrupt the flow 
of the defense’s presentation of its case, whereas cross-examination of 
the analyst during the prosecution’s case would follow traditional 
cross-examination procedure.109 Furthermore, in cases where the 
defendant does not wish to present a defense, Briscoe and Cypress 
claim that the Virginia statute forces the defendant to make the 
choice to either not cross-examine the lab analyst or abandon his plan 
and present a defense.110 
Finally, Briscoe and Cypress assert that they did not waive their 
confrontation rights by failing to call the analysts as witnesses.111 The 
risks and costs of calling laboratory analysts as a defense witnesses, 
they argue, make the Virginia procedure an “inferior alternative” to a 
system in which the prosecution is required to produce analysts and 
introduce the certificate of analysis at the same time.112 
B. The Commonwealth of Virginia’s Arguments 
Virginia first argues that Briscoe and Cypress did waive their 
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by refusing to either call the 
lab analysts or asking the prosecution to subpoena them.113 The 
Commonwealth contests the petitioners’ characterization of § 19.2–
187.1 as imposing a subpoena requirement on criminal defendants 
who wish to cross-examine analysts.114 Instead, it claims that the 
Virginia statute does not specify who must summon the analyst to 
testify, and that by failing to demand that the prosecution produce the 
analysts as witnesses, Briscoe and Cypress effectively waived their 
Confrontation Clause rights.115 This interpretation of the statute, 
Virginia contends, is confirmed by the opinion of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia.116 The Commonwealth argues that the Supreme Court 
 107. Id. at 18 (citing State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939)). 
 108. Id. at 20. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 23–24. 
 111. Id. at 8. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Brief of Respondents, supra note 92, at 13. 
 114. Id. at 15. 
 115. Id. at 15, 18. 
 116. Id. at 15–16. 




should wait to decide the constitutionality of § 19.2–187.1 on an as-
applied basis in a case where the defendant actually sought to call a 
laboratory analyst for cross-examination, rather than deem it 
unconstitutional on its face.117 
Second, Virginia is opposed to the Court deciding an issue based 
on “purely hypothetical scenarios.”118 In its view, Briscoe and Cypress 
cannot positively say that they would have been required to cross-
examine the analysts during the defense portion of the trial.119 The 
Commonwealth also argues that it is speculative to assume that the 
prosecution would be able to introduce the certificate of analysis 
before the analyst was called upon to testify.120 As neither Briscoe nor 
Cypress made any attempt to ensure that a laboratory analyst would 
appear at trial, Virginia says that petitioners’ claims are not supported 
by any factual experience.121 
Virginia argues that even if petitioners did not waive their 
confrontation rights, § 19.2–187.1 is nonetheless a sufficient and 
constitutional protection of confrontation rights because it provides a 
criminal defendant with the opportunity to cross-examine a 
laboratory analyst that has prepared a certificate of analysis used by 
the prosecution.122 The Commonwealth points out that the language 
of the Confrontation Clause does not specify or even suggest an order 
in which witness testimony and cross-examination must be presented 
in court.123 The phrase “to be confronted with,” it claims, means only 
that the prosecution may be required to bear the burden of ensuring 
the testimonial witness’s presence in the courtroom; it does not 
require a witness to be examined by the prosecution before being 
cross-examined by the defense.124 Virginia says that the authors of the 
clause wished only to ensure that criminal defendants had access to 
the tool of cross-examination which had been historically denied 
them—not to dictate a specific order of witness examination du
 trial.125 
 117. Id. at 23–24. 
 118. Id. at 19. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. at 22. 
 121. Id. at 24. 
 122. Id. at 25. 
 123. Id. at 28. 
 124. Id. at 29. 
 125. Id. at 31–32 (claiming that the Confrontation Clause was included in the Sixth 
Amendment in order to allow for cross-examination opportunities that were not available in the 
royal vice-admiralty courts of seventeenth century England). 
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ns would be swept into the orbit of the 
Confrontation Clause.”129 
endez-Diaz, her vote in Briscoe could 
ulti
 
Finally, Virginia cautions that interpreting the Confrontation 
Clause too broadly would cause problems in the daily operation of 
criminal trials.126 For example, it points out that concern about time 
gaps in relation to the Confrontation Clause could ultimately lead to 
allegations of a Sixth Amendment violation in the case of a routine 
recess between the direct examination and cross-examination of a 
witness.127 Virginia also foresees potential challenges in situations 
where a defense witness is called before a prosecution witness who is 
running late because of a delayed flight or a traffic jam.128 Accepting 
the petitioners’ arguments, the Commonwealth contends, could mean 
that “routine trial decisio
VII.  DISPOSITION 
Because Briscoe follows so closely on the heels of Melendez-Diaz, 
the four dissenters could be seeking to limit that decision’s impact.130 
It is even possible that the dissenters would vote to overturn the 
majority’s holding in Melendez-Diaz altogether. Their success would 
almost certainly depend on whether the dissenters could convince 
newly-appointed Justice Sonia Sotomayor to join them.131 Since 
Sotomayor replaced Justice David Souter, who voted with the five-
member majority in Mel
mately decide the case. 
Sotomayor, a former prosecutor, could prove amenable to 
prosecution-friendly arguments.132 The opinion that she wrote in 
United States v. Saget while sitting on the Second Circuit, however, 
indicates that she may be willing to stand firmly behind the Melendez-
Diaz holding that laboratory certificates of analysis are testimonial 
 126. Id. at 40. 
 the 
ing vote for the majority available to be shifted to the dissent by his 
e to 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 25, 2009) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent predicts that the Melendez-Diaz decision will strain
judicial system, thereby harming the efficient administration of justice in criminal cases. Id. 
 131. See Denniston, supra note 12 (theorizing that Justice Souter’s departure from the Court 
leaves his decid
replacement). 
 132. David R. Yannetti, Melendez-Diaz May Be Short-Lived Victory for Criminal 
Defendants, http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2009/Oct/63981.html (last visited Dec. 9, 
2009) (claiming that Sotomayor’s background as a prosecutor could make her more sensitiv
the high cost of administering justice problem alleged by the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz). 
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evidence.133 In Saget, which was written before Melendez-Diaz, 
Sotomayor suggested that the Supreme Court would eventually 
consider a statement to be “testimonial” evidence if the witness 
reasonably expected that the statement would be used in court.134 This 
prediction seems to fit the Melendez-Diaz standard, as a laboratory 
analyst preparing a certificate for the prosecution would 
icipate the statement of the test results to be used in court.135 
Even if Sotomayor does not vote to overrule Melendez-Diaz, 
however, it is likely that, as a former prosecutor, she will support 
limiting the further expansion of confrontation rights in the realm of 
laboratory certificates. In the end, Briscoe will probably be decided in 
favor of the respondents upholding state laws that guarantee criminal 
defendants the opportunity to cross-examine a laboratory analyst, 
including procedures that require a criminal defendant to subpoena 
the analyst. Justice Sotomayor will likely provide the swing vote in 
favor of balancing Sixth Amendment confrontation rights with the 
burden placed on the prosecutorial sys
st be brought into the courtroom.136 
Regardless of which party prevails, a desirable outcome would be 
one in which the Supreme Court provides a clear answer to the key 
question of whether or not the prosecution is always responsible 
under the Sixth Amendment for calling laboratory analysts to testify 
in cases involving certificates of analysis. If the Court does not reach 
the issue, either because it finds that petitioners waived their 
confrontation rights or because it does not wish to uphold a facial 
challenge to the Virginia statute, this area of criminal procedure will 
continue to be rife with confusion. If the Supreme Court uses Briscoe 
as an opportunity to clarify Melendez-Diaz and provide a solid 
answer about the nature and limits of the Confronta
 133. Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the 
Accused, 2009 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 223, 261–62 (2009). 
 134. Id. at 261. 
 135. Id. at 262. 
 136. Id. at 261. 
